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U.S. NAVY STRATEGY: OFFENSIVE STRIKE OR ESCORT?
Patrick T. Fennell
What type of Navy should we buy? How should it be employed
during war? These questions have been asked since the days of
the oared galleons. Ironically, as the answers become more
difficult, they become more imperative.
For the United States, the construction and employment of a
battle fleet depends as much on perceptions (right or wrong) as
it does on actual needs. A current need (actual or perceived) is
that the United States must build the type of fleet that will
best support the ground war effort in Europe against Warsaw Pact
forces
.
The Navy's official position is that fleets consisting of
big aircraft carriers, like the 90,000 ton Nimitz-class ships,
are necessary to enable the United States to strike deep into the
waters near the Soviet Union, and destroy its battle fleet before
it can reach open water.
Opponents of the Navy's stated requirement for big carriers
proffer reasons why they should not be built. Some aver they are
too expensive and too vulnerable, others that they do not advance
the proper mission of the Navy, which should be to protect the
vital shipping link between the United States and Europe. Pro-
tecting these sea lanes of communication (SLOC), they argue, is
the greatest contribution to the war effort in Europe the U.S.
Navy could possibly make. They believe the most effective fleet
for this mission is comprised of ships designed more for escort
duty than for power projection. Small carriers which deploy ASW
and patrol aircraft would be more appropriate for this task, and
less costly.
This paper will show, through historical analogy, that the
official Navy position is correct. That is, that large aircraft
carriers, capable of destroying the Soviet fleet in home waters,
provide the most effective aid to the ground campaign in Europe.
Specifically, this paper will use as an example the contributions
sea power made to a major land war to show that aggressive
strikes against an enemy fleet will bring about more favorable
results to the land campaign than would an escort navy. This
does not deny, however, that the Navy should also have an escort
capability. On the contrary, supplies crossing the ocean during
a war must be protected to ensure effective materiel support of
allied forces in Europe. The question this paper answers is
whether the U.S. Navy should focus on destruction of the enemy's
fleet, or protection of shipping, as its primary objective.
During the American Revolution, England's use of sea power to
affect the outcome of the land war was analogous in many respects
to the situation facing the United States today. It also
differed in some respects. These differences, or where similari-
ties end, will be discussed first, to put the subsequent
discussion of similarities in context. Next, some general
observations will be made concerning the advantages and dis-
advantages of offensive and defensive strategies with emphasis on
convoying, blockading, and destruction of the enemy's fleet.
Finally, lessons derived from the American Revolution will be
combined with the observations on strategy to show why the U.S.
Navy today must consider the destruction of the enemy's fleet as
its primary goal in any war with the Soviet Union. Although
England was involved in conflicts over possessions in South Asia,
the Mediterranean, and both East and West Indies at the time,
this paper is concerned only with what happened in North
America. Other areas of conflict are discussed only where they
affected the conduct of the war in North America.
The Royal English Navy had a long tradition of unchallenged
superiority over the seas. The dominance of British sea power
was reflected in the worldwide empire England had established
from the Mediterranean Sea to Africa, Asia and both Indies.
British sea power was now challenged, however, by an enemy
alliance superior in numbers of ships. Too, the distances between
England's many far-flung possessions meant that many of them were
exposed to enemy attacks while protected by a navy constrained in
its ability to strike offensively by the need to spread its
scant resources so thinly.
England decided to employ its fleet in a strategic defensive
posture, with detachments in every part of the world protecting
its interests. Thus English naval strategy was from the start
defensive, designed to protect as many as possible of the
empire's possessions against the numerically superior allied
fleets. As Alfred Thayer Mahan pointed out, this left the
English fleet awaiting "attacks which the enemies, superior in
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every case, could make at their own choice and their own time."
While trying to protect the British Isles, and their
possessions in the East and West Indies and North America, the
Royal Navy suffered numerous defeats by the French, with the
subsequent loss of colonies. The most important of these losses
were the thirteen American colonies.
Many significant differences between England's position then
and the U.S. position now result from modern technology. Communi-
cation times between the British Isles and the remote reaches of
the empire were much greater than they are now. Communications
between a base and its outposts, such as England and its
colonies, then took months. Now they are instantaneous.
The great advantages of steam over sail propulsion are that
ships are no longer limited by the wind in the courses they can
steer and their speed. The advent of the torpedo and submarine
changed naval warfare by creating subsurface dimensions and the
demand for new technological capabilities.
Technological advances have changed naval warfare, none more
profoundly on the relationship of war at sea to war ashore as the
changes brought about by aircraft and missiles. With current
technology, submarines and surface-ships operating off European
coasts can affect the ground campaign directly in a way which
naval forces were unable to do in the past. Sea-launched cruise
missiles with large warheads, ranges in excess of 1,000 kilo-
meters, and pinpoint accuracy, can participate in tactical combat
ashore. The ability of modern warships to project power ashore
may initiate a need to project power from the shore out to the
sea, to counter sea power. Thus, in the correlations of forces
affecting land and sea battles, modern warfare may have come full
circle. Just as man for centuries has attempted to improve his
means of projecting power ashore, he now must devise ways to
counter the effect of sea power on shore.
Thus, sea control takes on a new meaning, and greater
benefits accrue to whichever side possesses it. If sea control
connotes the ability to operate at sea and accomplish one's
mission effectively, then sea control for the United States Navy
could mean direct participation in the battle in Europe, not just
a supporting role.
Another difference between Britain's support of its forces in
North America during the Revolution and U.S. support of Allies in
Europe today is that the North American continent was very porous
then. All the major theaters were bisected by rivers and bays,
and the most effective way to move troops and supplies around in
the war was by water. Therefore, control of waterways by English
or French sea power affected the tactical as well as the
strategic outcome of the war.
Europe, even today, is not as accessible by water as the
North American continent was for the British. Once supplies are
delivered to ports in France, Denmark or Germany, they must be
moved inland primarily by rail, canal, or highway. This limits
the effect of sea transport on the war to a more strategic role.
The last major difference to be discussed is that the
English in 1778 had no clear picture of their options at the
time, as the United States does now. The English faced an assault
against their entire empire, of which the North American
continent was only a part. To them the only course was to
protect their colonies, all of them, lest their empire should
crumble. In retrospect, a Royal Navy blockade or defeating the
principal threat might have achieved more satisfactory results.
There was no clear-cut choice between one strategy and
another for the English. The British attempted to protect the
whole empire. (The British did not have such a firm attachment
to the colonies on the North American continent as would have
made them obviously the most important and most critical object
of the Royal Navy's efforts.) They had no choice but to spread
out the fleet, leaving small units everywhere, vulnerable to
attack by a superior enemy. There was no enemy fleet patrolling
North America against which the English fleet needed to fight.
There were large enemy fleets which could be blockaded in their
ports, but English eyes focused on their colonial possessions,
over which the war was being fought.
The most obvious similarity in the effect of sea power upon
a ground war between England and her American colonies and the
United States today is that in each case they were forced to
conduct warfare in distant lands across the sea, most effectively
reached, by sea. Just as England was supporting its forces in
America, the United States today would have to support theirs in
Europe.
Valuable lessons can be drawn from Mahan's analysis of the
role of sea power in the American Revolution. They demand a more
complete and precise description of the situation facing the
Royal Navy.
Sea power's two essential elements must be described. The
first element is the effective use of ports, harbors, bays,
rivers, etc., and transit lanes between them. Development of
these areas stems from a strong interest in trade. For England
in 1778, it consisted of ports in the British Isles and America,
and the Atlantic sea lanes over which ships traveled.
The second element of sea power is a fleet in being, capable
of ensuring free use of the oceans. For this paper, sea control
is defined as the ability to employ these elements effectively
to obtain stated goals.
This is where advocates of an escort navy for the United
States, with only adjunct aircraft carriers, often leave their
argument. Their analysis of how to utilize sea power stops once
it is established that the essence of sea power is maintaining
control of the sea lines of communication. They establish as
their fleets mission assisting soldiers on the ground as effec-
tively as possible, which requires the secure ports and SLOCs.
Thus, they feel, the proper objective of the fleet should be to
protect the ships as they transit the SLOCs.
As Mahan notes, designating protection of commerce as the
sole objective of the fleet is misguided. An enemy's fleet alone
can stop a country from achieving it's object at sea, and hence
destruction of the enemy's fleet is the only proper objective of
any navy. As Mahan wrote:
"This combination of useful harbors and the
conditions of the communications between them
constitute, as has been said, the main stra-
tegic outlines of the situation. The navy, as
the organized force linking the whole
together, has been indicated as the principal
objective of military effort. M 2
In 1778, the English did not regard the enemy fleets as the
principal objective of the Royal Navy. They subdivided their
fleet in the hopes of protecting their manifold possessions
without focusing on destroying the enemy fleets. Indeed, the
enemy fleets were widely scattered and evidence has been adduced
that they would have succumbed to a challenge from a superior
British fleet. The Royal Navy rarely took the initiative to
attack segments of the French and Spanish fleets aggressively.
There are, of course, exceptions, but it is apparent that the
English, adopting a defensive strategy, committed themselves to
being the objects of enemy aggression on a strategic scale,
rather than being the aggressors.
Having described England's decision and its poor results, a
more acceptable and possibly more successful alternative is
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suggested. What exactly was the proper course for the English
navy, and what might its conseguences have been?
As briefly mentioned earlier, England should have realized
the full complex of its plight. It could not possibly defend
everything when faced by superior forces at times and locations
chosen by the enemy. Facing a superior enemy and embarrassed by
the great number of exposed points, it should have been an
immediate task to outline priorities for the navy. Had they done
so, it is likely that preservation of the American colonies under
English rule would have been at the top of the list. They were
the jewels of the empire. Other possessions were important to
the empire and could be used to divert enemy resources from other
areas. Mahan makes the point that Gibraltar was very useful to
this end, but should Port Mahon, located near Gibraltar, have
been protected so desperately as to drain English resources from
other areas? The English faced similar decisions in the East and
West Indies. What possessions could be most easily held, which
were the most valuable? Having made these decisions, those which
could not be held without extreme effort, and were least
valuable to England, should have been abandoned to allow for
greater concentration of forces where needed.
Having decided upon concentrating forces and establishing the
destruction of the enemy fleets as its primary objective, the
Royal Navy could pursue their objectives at locations most likely
to be productive, their home ports. Blockading ports on the
coasts of France and Spain would ensure the English the advan-
tages of mobility, initiative, and accurate intelligence as to
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the enemy's whereabouts. There were, however, the problems of
maintaining close blockades in the face of winter gales. The
First Lord of the Admiralty wrote to Rodney,
"It is impossible for us to have a superior
fleet in every port; and unless our
commanders-in-chief will take the great line,
as you do, and consider the king's whole
dominions under their care, our enemies must
find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their
point against us. "5
History shows that had England adopted a naval strategy of
concentrated offensives against the enemy fleets it might well
have retained possession of and control over its valuable North
American colonies. Continual retreats and refusal to oppose the
offensive against the enemy left the outcome more to chance than
choice.
Several events prior to the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at
Yorktown show quite clearly that advantages could have been
gained by the English by concentrating its naval forces, which,
if properly executed, may have saved North America for the
British.
Rodney, the English naval commander in the West Indies, had a
fleet superior in numbers to the combined allied French and
Spanish fleets after the departure of the French commander, De
Guichen, for France with fifteen ships. Rodney, concerned that
De Guichen may have been headed for the North American continent,
and apprehensive about leaving the West Indies unprotected,
divided his forces in half. Mahan noted,
"The risk thus run was very great, and
scarcely justifiable; but no ill effect
followed the dispersal of forces. Had De
Guichen intended to turn upon Jamaica, or, as
was expected by Washington, upon New York,
neither part of Rodney's fleet could well have
withstood him. Two chances of disaster,
instead of one, were run, by being in small




The incident took place in September 1780.
The previous July, French reinforcements totaling five
thousand troops, under the command of Rochambeau, and seven
ships-of -the-line , under the command of De Ternay, reached the
American coast. Rodney had superior naval forces when he arrived
at New York, avoided an opportunity to attack the seven French
ships in Newport, and returned to the West Indies in October.
"Why . . . when the departure of De Guichen for
Europe left Rodney markedly superior in
numbers during his short visit to North
America, from September 14 to November 14,
should no attempt have been made to destroy
the French detachment of seven ships-of -the-
line in Newport? These ships had arrived
there in July; but although they had at once
strengthened their position by earthworks,
great alarm was excited by the news of
Rodney's appearance off the coast. A
fortnight passed by Rodney in New York and by
the French in busy work, placed the latter, in
their own opinion, in a position to brave all
the naval force of England. "7
Although the French expressed feelings of invulnerability
after fortifying their position in Narragansett Bay, there were
differing opinions expressed by contemporary English sailors.
One of these claimed that an English attack of twenty ships upon
the French seven would undoubtedly have succeeded.
"In the opinion of a distinguished English
naval officer [Sir Thomas Graves] of the day
closely familiar with the ground, there was
no doubt of the success of an attack; and he
urged it frequently upon Rodney, offering
himself to pilot the leading ship. "8
Rodney's failure to attack the enemy's fleet, when he out-
numbered them by almost three-to-one, is symptomatic of the
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lackadaisical attitude of the English at the time. Having
adopted a defensive strategy from the beginning, the English
admirals became inured by it, and failed to focus on their only
true objective, the enemy fleet. Mahan wrote,
"It is not, however, merely as an isolated
operation, but in relation to the universal
war, that such an attempt is here considered.
England stood everywhere on the defensive,
with inferior numbers. From such a position
there is no salvation except by action
vigorous almost to desperation. . . Attacks
which considered in themselves alone might be
though unjustifiable, were imposed upon
English commanders. The allied navy was the
key of the situation, and its large
detachments, as at Newport, should have been
crushed at any risk. The effect of such a
line of action upon the policy of the French
government is a matter of speculation, as to
which the present writer has no doubts; but no
English officer in chief command rose to the
level of the situation, with the exception of
Hood, and possibly of Howe. Rodney was now
old, infirm, and though of great ability, a
careful tactician rather than a great
admiral. "9
Following Rodney's failure to engage the French detachment at
Newport, and his subsequent return to the West Indies, French
reinforcements arrived in the West Indies. After minor action
between English Admirals Rodney and Hood and the French commander
Comte de Grasse, the latter received a despatch from Generals
Washington and Rochambeau "upon which he was to take the most




The fatal blow for England was to take place at Yorktown, on
the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. It emphasized the premier
importance of sea power in the final outcome. Mahan quotes the
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English commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Clinton, as he said,
"Operations on the Chesapeake are attended with great risk unless
we are sure of a permanent superiority at sea. I tremble for the
fatal consequences that may ensue." For Cornwallis had taken
matters into his own hands and decided the next action should
take place on the Chesapeake, a location which he thought the
11
"proper seat of war".
Lord Cornwallis was instructed by Clinton to occupy Yorktown,
on a peninsula in the Chesapeake between the York and James
Rivers, and enclosed by water on three sides. It was now up to
the allied armies in New York to march to Yorktown and cut off
Cornwallis' only dry escape route, while the allied navies fought
the English for control of the seaward approaches to Yorktown.
Control of the sea in and around the Chesapeake Bay was crucial
to the outcome of the war. French superiority in numbers, 24
ships to the English 19, enabled them to harass the English fleet
outside of the Chesapeake while De Barras, with more French
ships, sailed undetected into the Chesapeake and anchored. De
Grasse broke off his holding actions against the English and,
sailing his nineteen ships into the bay, secured firm control of
the sea for the allies and eventually forced the surrender of
Cornwallis.
It must be noted that the seven French ships which Rodney
could have engaged in battle might easily have made the
difference in the conflict for control of the Chesapeake. The
English, with better numerical odds, might have been able to fend
off the French, secure the Chesapeake, and protect Cornwallis'
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retreat: or keep him supplied for a counterattack, as required.
The role played by superior naval forces, resulting in
control of the sea, was a major determinant in the outcome of the
American Revolution. There is no better testament to this than
the letters and proclamations of George Washington:
"In any operation, and under all
circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is
to be considered as a fundamental principle,
and the basis upon which every hope of success
must ultimately depend. "12
He also stated:
"Next to a loan of money, a constant naval
superiority upon these coasts is the object
most interesting. This would instantly
reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive . .
.
Indeed, it is not to be conceived how they
could subsist a large force in this country,
if we had the command of the seas to
interrupt the regular transmission of
supplies from Europe. This superiority, with
an aid in money, would enable us to convert
the war into a vigorous offensive. With
respect to us it seems to be one of two
deciding points. "13
Note that Washington, in his infinite wisdoms, emphasizes the
importance of naval superiority, rather than merely safe escort
for his transports!
It is also important to note that, although the Americans and
French defeated the English on the North American continent, they
did so by the narrowest of margins. Numerous threats of defeat
were overcome only by slight changes of luck, opinions, actions,
or combinations thereof. That the allies did not achieve a
decisive victory easily, even though the commerce-destroying
efforts of allied navies and American privateers for inflicted
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great casualties on English commerce, demonstrates the triviality
of commerce-destroying as a primary naval strategy. Indeed, as
Mahan remarked, "the lack of effect commerce-destroying had on
the general outcome of the whole war shows "strongly the
secondary and indecisive effect of such a policy upon the great
issues of war."
Commerce-destroying against a sea power like the United
States can affect the nation, but in war it can rarely, if ever,
overcome the ability of that nation to replace its losses and
strike back at the enemy. As Mahan reflected,
"Where the revenues and industries of a
country can be concentrated into a few
treasure-ships, like the flota of Spanish
galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut
by a single stroke; but when its wealth is
scattered in thousands of going and coming
ships, when the roots of the system spread
wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand
many a cruel shock and many a goodly bough
without the life being touched. Only by
military command of the sea by prolonged
control of the strategic centers of commerce,
can such an attack be fatal; and such control
can be wrung from a powerful navy only by
fighting and overcoming it. 14
This is why the United States Navy must be able to challenge the
Soviet fleet, and destroy it in battle. Only by maintaining that
capability can U.S. sea power support the European front
decisively.
This historical episode demonstrates several lessons appli-
cable to present day navies. It offers lessons which can be
applied by the U.S. Navy in battles against the Soviets in
Europe. The inutility of commerce-destroying and defensive
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postures, as primary objectives of the fleet will be documented,
as will the positive effects indeed the necessity of choosing
destruction of the enemy fleet as the primary objective.
In the American Revolution, two decisive factors were
determined the outcome in favor of the French and the Americans.
First, was the English attempt to protect everything, relegating
the Royal Navy to a purely defensive role, destined to be out-
numbered when they met the enemy. Second, was the Royal Navy's
failure to agree that their primary objective was to destroy the
enemy fleets.
For the U.S. Navy to adopt convoying as its primary function
in wartime might well invite disaster. As long as an opposing
fleet exists somewhere with significant offensive capability, the
U.S. Navy must be prepared to attack that fleet, with sufficient
offensive power to defeat.
To assign the U.S. fleet an escort role in the face of a
potent enemy fleet would mean that it, like England's during the
American Revolution, would be subject to attacks at times and
places of the enemy's choosing, with numbers and fire-power
favorable to the enemy.
America's coastline, though not a likely target of the Soviet
navy, would nevertheless be difficult to protect if the Soviets
chose to harass them as an objective of their fleet. It has
already been suggested how much technology has favored projection
of power ashore. Without strong offensive fighting ships capable
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of defeating a large Soviet fleet our coastlines may be left
open.
The English experience bears some testimony to this point.
The French and Spanish fleets kept the Royal Navy in check
throughout most of the war. The Channel fleet was driven into
port numerous times, and Gibraltar saved from starvation and
defeat only by the ineptitude of its besiegers. Under the
circumstances, it is conceivable that the French and Spanish
could have succeeded in landing troops on English soil had they
made a concentrated, coordinated effort.
Failure of the U.S. Navy to attack the enemy fleet, with
equal or superior forces might also leave commercial shipping,
vital convoys to Europe, and the ports they use, open to enemy
attack. Control of the sea being a fleeting impermanent affair,
a large Soviet naval force could descend on the European coast,
mauling shipping and harbors, maintaining temporary but adequate
control wherever they went. In short, if the United States has
no fleet capable of defeating them, they may impose their will
when and where they choose. The U.S. Navy would lose the ability
to effect the ground directly, and quite possibly the Soviet Navy
would use their ability to do so very effectively, with
disastrous consequences.
The Soviet ability to impose control of the sea in specific
area could impose difficulties for the U.S. to support Europe.
Failure to resupply our allies in Europe could result in termi-
nation of the NATO alliance and the war, on terms immensely
17
favorable to the Soviet Union.
Thus, the United States Navy must be capable of destroying
any enemy fleet, for, only by doing so can the threat of a Soviet
fleet imposing its itinerant will upon our vital SLOCs, harbors,
and coastal areas be eliminated.
18
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